

# EECS3342: Specification and Refinement Bank System to illustrate parameters

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- 1 Requirements Documents
- 2 The Event-B Modelling Method
  - Contexts and Machines
  - Refinement
- 3 Formal Methods

# A Structured Requirement Documents

## A small bank

A bank provides its customers with cash accounts. Customers can deposit and withdraw cash. Balances may not be less than a global credit limit. Withdrawals cannot be more than available in the cash draw.

REQ 1	The bank maintains a set of accounts.
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REQ 2	Customers can deposit and withdraw cash.
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- Two **separate texts** in the same document:
  - **explanatory** text: the **why**
  - **reference** text: the **what**
- **Embedding** the reference text within the explanation text
- Convert into **atomic** statements

# Reference Text vs. Explanatory Text

## Reference Text

- is inside the boxes,
- forms a **contract**,
- is concise and self-contained,
- describes the **“what”**

## Explanatory Text

- is outside the boxes,
- is **unofficial**,
- improves readable,
- explains the **“why”**

# Labels for Reference Text

- Reference text is denoted with an **unique label**.
- Each label forms by some **short text** and a **number**.
- Taxonomy (incomplete):
  - Requirements: REQ
  - Requirements: ENV
  - Assumption: ASM
  - Functional: FUN
  - Environment: EVN
  - Safety: SAF
  - Security: SEC

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## REQ

- **aims/goals** of the system

REQ 3	All account balances shall exceed a global credit limit.
-------	--

## ENV (environmental constraints/assumptions)

- **properties** of the system that can be assumed.

ENV 4	Bank tellers do not register withdrawals requiring more than available in the cash draw
-------	---

env

## Common Problems

- vague and **unspecific** statements
- **over-specification**
- **irrelevant** assumptions
- **missing** requirements
- **missing** assumptions

## General Guidelines

- **Explain** ambiguous terms
- Be brief, dry, **to the point**
- Keep your **vocabulary small**



# Event-B Modelling Method

- A model: **discrete transition systems**:
  - (infinite) states
  - transitions
- Consists of **contexts** and **machines**.



Figure: The sees relationship

- Carrier sets, e.g. *ACCOUNT* which is the set of all bank accounts
- Constants, e.g. the credit limit  $c$ .
- Axioms / theorems
- Consistency: theorems is **derivable** from axioms

## Describing REQ1: bank accounts; REQ3: credit limit $c$

**carrier sets:** *ACCOUNT*

**constants:**  $c$

**axioms:**

**axm0\_1** :  $c \in \mathbb{N}1$

**thm0\_2** :  $c > 0$

- Variables, e.g.  $b$  as a map from each account in the system to their corresponding balances
- Invariants / theorems
- Events (next slides)

## Variables: cash drawer $d$ and account balances $b$

**variables:**  $d, b$

**invariants:**

**inv0\_1** :  $d \in \mathbb{N}$

**inv0\_2** :  $b \in \text{ACCOUNT} \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}$

init

**begin**

$d \in \mathbb{N}$

$b \in \text{ACCOUNT} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$

**end**

**variables:**  $b$

**invariants:**  
 $\text{inv0\_2} : b \in \text{ACCOUNT} \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}$

## Example

E.g.,  $b = \{a1 \mapsto 0, a2 \mapsto 25\}$

$b(a2)$  = balance of account  $a2$  is \$25

```
name
  any parameters where
    guard
  then
    action
  end
```

- An event is **enabled**: There exists some value for the parameters such that the guard holds.

## deposit and withdraw events

```
deposit
  any a, v where
     $a \in \text{dom}(b)$ 
     $v \in \mathbb{N1}$ 
  then
     $d := d + v$ 
     $b(a) := b(a) + v$ 
  end
```

```
withdraw
  any a, v where
     $a \in \text{dom}(b)$ 
     $v \in \mathbb{N1}$ 
  then
     $d := d - v$ 
     $b(a) := b(a) - v$ 
  end
```

- When all events are **not enabled**, the system **stops**.
- When some events are **enabled**
  - One of them is chosen (together with the correct parameter)
  - Its action is carried out.

# Consistency 1

- 1 Theorems.
- 2 Invariants (taken from atomic requirements)

```
inv0_1 : d ∈ ℕ
inv0_2 : ∀ a. a ∈ dom(b) ⇒ b(a) ≥ -c
```

- Establishment

```
init
  begin
    d := ∈ ℕ
    b := ∈ ACCOUNT → ℕ
  end
```

inv0\_1: Required to prove that:  $d' \in \mathbb{N}$

- Maintenance

```
withdraw
  any a, v where
    a ∈ dom(b)
    v ∈ ℕ1
  then
    d := d - v
    b(a) := b(a) - v
  end
```

inv0\_1: Required to prove that  $d' \in \mathbb{N}$  where  $d' = d - v$ . **Proof will not work.**  
Why?

# New atomic requirement

REQ 5

Withdrawals cannot be for more cash than is in the cash drawer.

## Describing the cash drawer $d$

**variables:**  $d, b$

**invariants:**  
 $\text{inv0\_1} : d \in \text{NAT}$

```
withdraw
  any  $a, v$  where
     $a \in \text{dom}(b)$ 
     $b(a) - v \geq -c$ 
     $v \leq d$ 
  then
     $b(a) := b(a) - v$ 
     $d := d - v$ 
  end
```



# Consistency 2

- 1 Theorems.
- 2 Invariants (taken from atomic requirements)

```
inv0_1 : d ∈ ℕ  
inv0_2 : ∀ a. a ∈ dom(b) ⇒ b(a) ≥ -c
```

- Establishment

```
init  
  begin  
    d := 0  
    b := ACCOUNT ↦ 0  
  end
```

required to prove that:  
 $b(a) \geq -c$

- Maintenance

```
withdraw  
  any a, v where  
    a ∈ dom(b)  
    v ∈ ℕ1  
  then  
    d := d - v  
    b(a) := b(a) - v  
  end
```

required to prove that **under the invariant and guard**,  $b'(a) - v \geq -c$  where  $b'$  is the new balance after initialization.

# Preserving the invariants

Required to prove that **under the invariant and guard**,  $b'(a) - v \geq -c$

```
withdraw
  any a, v where
    a ∈ dom(b)
    v ∈ ℕ1
     $b(a) - v \geq -c$ 
  then
    b(a) := b(a) - v
  end
```

# Refinement (1/2)




Figure: Refinement

- Contexts can be **extended**.
- Machines can be **refined**.
- The abstract model can **simulate** the concrete model

# Refinement (2/2)

- Intuition: refinement **reduces** behaviours of the model.

## Example. Limited deposit

```
(abs_)deposit
  any a, v where
    a ∈ dom(b) ∧ v ∈ ℕ
  then
    b(a) := b(a) + v
  end
```

```
(cnc_)deposit
  any a, v where
    a ∈ dom(b) ∧ v ∈ ℕ
    v ≤ L - b(a)
  then
    b(a) := b(a) + v
  end
```

- Refinement **consistency** needs to be proved.

# Incremental Formal Development




Figure: Incremental development

# Incremental Formal Development




Figure: Incremental development

- A model is a **discrete transition system**,
- consists of **contexts** and **machines**.
- **Consistency**:
  - theorems (of contexts and machines),
  - invariants,
  - refinement.

# What you need for formal reasoning 1

- Insights about **modelling** and **formal reasoning**.
- Systems can be **correct-by-construction**.
- Modelling can be **made practical**.



# What you need for formal reasoning 2

- **Modelling** (versus programming)
- **Abstraction** and **refinement**
- Some **mathematical techniques** used for reasoning.
- The practice of incremental development: **modelling** and **proving**.
- The usage of some **proving tools**.

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# Theorem Proving: Model Construction

- It concentrates on the construction of models by  
    **successive refinements**
- The properties to be proved are parts of the models:  
    **invariants** and **refinement**

# Why Using Formal Methods with Proofs?

- When there is **nothing better available**.
- When the **risk** is too high (e.g. in **embedded systems**).
- When people have already **suffered enough**.
- When people question their **development process**.
- Decision of using formal methods is **always strategic**.

# Which Formal Method with Proofs?

- This is a **difficult** question.
- Today many formal methods **vendors**.
- “Formal method” has become a meaningless **buzz word**.
- “Formal” alone **does not mean anything**.

# Claimed Difficulties in Applying Formal Methods

- They are **only** used for safety-critical systems.
- You have to be a **mathematician**.
  - **Formalism** is hard to master.
  - People will **not** be able to do formal **proofs**.
- Formal models are **hard to understand**
  - Not **visual** enough (no boxes, arrows, etc.).
- Formal methods lack **tools**.
- References:
  - Seven Myths of Formal Methods. (1990, by Hall)  
<http://www.seas.upenn.edu/~lee/09cis480/papers/7myths1990.pdf>
  - Seven More Myths of Formal Methods. (1995, by Bowen&Hinchey)  
[http://lml.ls.fi.upm.es/rsd/Papers/seven\\_more\\_myths.pdf](http://lml.ls.fi.upm.es/rsd/Papers/seven_more_myths.pdf)

# Genuine Difficulties in Applying Formal Methods

- **Model building** is an elaborate activity.
- You have to **think a lot** before final coding.
- Incorporation in **development process**.
- **Reasoning** by means of **proof** is necessary.
- Making proofs a **design criterion**.
- Poor quality of **requirement documents**.